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‘We’ve slid into the worst crisis since the end of the Cold War.’ 
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 1
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea territory in March 2014 has raised serious questions about the end of the 
post-Cold War era. The spectacle of Russian troops ignoring the sovereignty of Ukraine’s borders and annexing 
Crimea has taken us back to a world long forgotten – particularly in Europe. This is a world where the sanctity 
of internationally recognised borders is ignored, the use of military force is back in command and where a 
nuclear-armed major power acts with impunity in its own neighbourhood.
This COG paper will analyse, first, the reasons why President Putin decided to invade Ukraine and annex 
Crimea; second, the implications of this for Russia’s return as a major power; and third what the broader 
geopolitical policy implications are – not only for Europe but also in Asia. For Australia, this distant conflict has 
implications for the new Defence White Paper because it requires us to refocus on such issues as interstate 
conflict, the role of large authoritarian states with respect to smaller countries, and the use of military force for 
traditional realpolitik aims.
The approach taken in this paper is to seek to understand what motivated Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to 
use military force against Ukraine. This necessarily involves trying to divine the issue from a Russian mindset 
and get behind the reasons why Moscow now has such a hostile attitude towards the West. It must be 
stressed that this approach (which is a classical intelligence analysis methodology) is not to condone Russia’s 
belligerence or to underrate the illegal challenge that has occurred to Ukrainian sovereignty. Nor is it to ignore 
the possible implications for other independent countries, such as the Baltic States, located in the strategic 
space of the former Soviet Union.
POLICY RECOMMENDATION
•	 Australia’s defence strategy should now take account of how major powers such as China and 
Russia might use conventional force, or threats of use of conventional force, to challenge territorial 
sovereignty and impose their will more generally. 
•	 Canberra also needs to factor into its strategic assessments the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on 
a) China’s strategic policy and regional ambitions and b) the US military commitment to Asia.
•	 Given the rise of military capabilities and nationalism in our region, the new Defence White Paper 
should give appropriate priority to policies of countering conventional threats and coercion, including 
from major powers. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•	 This is the worst crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold War. It marks the return of a Russia 
hostile to the West that is prepared to reject international norms about state sovereignty and risk 
confrontation with NATO. Under Putin, we can expect protracted and wider confrontation with 
the West.
•	 Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea because he regarded the threat of Ukraine’s membership 
of NATO as undermining Russia’s vital national security interests.
•	 Russia has significantly improved its military capabilities since its invasion of Georgia in 2008. This 
was demonstrated in the surprise occupation of Crimea. Moscow’s positioning of 50,000 troops on 
the eastern Ukrainian border threatens further intervention, the risk of civil war and military conflict 
with Ukraine.
•	 The strategic implications for Australia are whether Washington’s pivot to Asia will now be diverted to 
Europe and whether China also will be encouraged to greater territorial adventurism.
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Why Did Putin Decide to Invade Ukraine?
To a greater or lesser extent, most countries are prisoners of their geographic location, history and culture. This 
applies especially to Russia with its vulnerable geography, its experience of both invasion and imperial 
expansion, and its long history of authoritarian rulers. All these factors come into play given the special position 
of Ukraine in Moscow’s perceptions of Kiev as ‘the mother of Russian cities’ and the cradle of the Russian 
Orthodox faith. Ukraine means far more than any other part of ‘the near abroad’ to Moscow because it is tied 
so closely to Russia’s sense of itself. Even Russian liberals have trouble accepting the notion that Ukraine is an 
independent country and, in the eyes of many Russians, eastern and central Ukraine are historically 
Russian lands.2
There is, of course, a quite different Ukrainian view of 
a long history of Russian and Soviet repression of their 
language and culture. In particular, the huge loss of 
more than 5 million people in the 1930s under Stalin’s 
forced collectivisation campaign. The harsh treatment 
of alleged Nazi collaborators in the Second World War 
also looms large in the Ukrainian historical memory.
Vladimir Putin, however, sees things from the 
traditional perspective of a former KGB colonel. He 
believes that the West wants his overthrow — just as occurred in Kiev to former President Yanukovych. He 
deeply distrusts NATO and what he firmly believes are its attempts to encircle Russia, including by extending 
NATO membership to Ukraine. Putin has a deep sense of the loss of power and prestige of the former Soviet 
Union, which he describes as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. And he has an acute 
belief of Russia’s need to protect its citizens living in the former Soviet strategic space. In an April 17 interview, 
Putin declared ‘We have reached a point beyond which we cannot retreat.’3 The spectre of Ukraine under the 
post-Yanukovych regime joining the EU and NATO was unacceptable to him. And he well knows that the West 
has significantly lower stakes in Ukraine’s fate than does Russia.
“ Ukraine means far more than any 
other part of the ‘near abroad’ to 
Moscow because it is tied so closely 
to Russia’s sense of itself. ”
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Putin states that the West has deceived Russia by the expansion of NATO to its very borders. Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania are members of NATO, as are Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. If Ukraine were to join NATO this 
would put NATO forces within 400 km of Moscow. NATO expansion has resulted in Russia losing huge areas 
of territory flanking its Western approaches, a traditional invasion route. Moscow is of the view that Russia’s 
present borders are unnatural in the sense that they do not guarantee a reasonable level of national security.4 
The defence of Russian territory would be directly threatened if Ukraine were a member of NATO, hosting NATO 
military forces. 
The Russian naval base at Sebastopol in the Crimea 
is vital for the access of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet 
to the Mediterranean. Putin decided he could not 
tolerate a pro-Western government in Kiev denying 
him this crucial military asset. He may well have 
convinced himself that such a government would 
include far-right leaders who would revoke Russia’s 
basing agreement in Crimea and quickly move 
Ukraine to NATO membership.5 
There are ancient cultural and religious ties between Russia and Ukraine: Kiev is where Russian Christianity 
began over 1000 years ago. The Russians call their fellow Slavs in Ukraine ‘Little Russians’. The eastern part of 
Ukraine (which historically the Russians called Novorossiya or New Russia) is predominantly Russian speaking, 
Russian Orthodox in religion and heavily industrialised, whereas the western part of Ukraine is predominantly 
Ukrainian speaking, Catholic and rural. Ethnic Russians account for 40% of the population in eastern Ukraine 
and almost 60% of the population in Crimea.
Historically, Poland dominated western Russia and present-day Ukraine for centuries: in the early 1600s, in a 
period known as ‘the time of troubles’ (smutnoe vremya), a Polish army from Lviv invaded Moscow and placed 
a pretender on the czar’s throne. This was a time of great social and political upheaval in the state of Muscovy, 
which faced uncertainty about its very existence.6 Many Russians see parallels with the upheavals of post-
“ Moscow is of the view that Russia’s 
present borders are unnatural…they 
do not guarantee a reasonable level of 
national security. ”
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Soviet Russia. Putin’s suspicious mind probably sees meddling by Poland in the overthrow of Yanukovych and 
the presence in Kiev at that time in February 2014 of the Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorsky.
The bottom line is that the issue of Ukraine is central to Russians’ identity of themselves. That is why Putin has 
promised to take all possible measures to defend Russian citizens in Ukraine and reserves the right to use force 
to protect Russia’s interests there. He already appears to be using the powers of Russia’s security organs and 
Special Forces covertly to foment instability and insurrection in the name of protecting Russian citizens living in 
the adjoining regions of Ukraine. There is a real risk of him seizing the Ukraine—or at least its eastern parts—if 
upheaval there threatens the lives of Russians. He has an army of 40-50,000 troops just across the border 
ready and prepared to intervene.
Putin’s standing as a strong leader in the Russian tradition has grown enormously as a result of this crisis. He 
received numerous standing ovations during his speech on 18 March in the Kremlin. In the celebrations in Red 
Square to mark the return of Crimea to Russia there were frequent calls of ‘glory to Putin’.7 The annexation of 
Crimea has huge support among almost 80% of the Russian people, including former leader Gorbachev. 
Is the Russian Bear Back?
Putin is demonstrating that Russia as a major power 
is back in business. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
has said that ‘Russia is a big power that knows what it 
wants’.8 The Russian bear is flexing its military muscle, 
but we should not be deceived that this is a return of 
the old Soviet Union as a global military power. There 
are still real limitations on the capacity of Moscow 
to project conventional military power at any great 
distance. 9 However, since its invasion of Georgia in 2008 Russia’s military forces have undoubtedly improved 
— especially its airborne troops and Special Forces. Moscow appears to have used the cover of a large military 
exercise involving 140,000 troops to disguise its pre-emptive strike in Crimea. This was a classic Soviet use of 
masking operations (maskirovka). In addition to Ukraine, other countries adjoining Russia’s borders — such as 
Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — must now see themselves at risk.
“ Putin is demonstrating that  
Russia as a major power is back  
in business. ”
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Retired former US NATO commander, Admiral James G. Stavridis, has remarked that there has been a 
significant shift in how Russian ground forces have deployed. They skilfully used 21st-century tactics that 
combined cyber warfare, an energetic information campaign, and the use of highly trained special operations 
troops to seize the initiative from the West: he states ‘They have played their hand of cards with finesse.’10 It is a 
military that is a far cry from the Army disparaged for its decline since the fall of the Soviet Union. Its strength in 
the occupation of Crimea lay in covert action combined with sound intelligence concerning the weakness of the 
Kiev government and their will to respond militarily. 
According to NATO commander General Philip M. Breedlove, the Russian forces disconnected the Ukrainian 
forces in Crimea from their command and control.11 They used a so-called snap military exercise to distract 
attention and hide their preparations. Then specially trained troops, without identifying patches, moved quickly 
to secure key installations. Once the operation was underway, Russian forces cut telephone cables, jammed 
communications, and used cyber warfare to cut off the Ukrainian military forces on the peninsula.
This sort of strategy will work best in areas close to 
Russian territory where a large and intimidating force 
can be assembled and where there are pockets of 
ethnic Russians to provide local support across the 
neighbouring border. Such a force can be used in 
the whole former Soviet space, including the Baltic 
countries, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and the former Soviet Central Asian states. Admiral 
Stavridis argues that NATO now needs to study and 
factor into its planning Russia’s deft use of cyber 
warfare, Special Forces and conventional troops: ‘In 
all those areas they have raised their game, and they 
have integrated them quite capably’.12
None of this is in any way to approve of Putin’s use of military force and what it means for the future of an 
independent Ukraine. But unless we understand what is inside Putin’s head, the West will continue to be 
surprised by his actions. In my view, he will not be deterred by the West’s economic sanctions, which he will 
“ Russian forces disconnected the 
Ukrainian forces in Crimea from 
their command and control… (they) 
cut telephone cables, jammed 
communications, and used cyber 
warfare. ”
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simply stare down. And he will seek to drive wedges between America and European countries that are heavily 
dependent upon Russia for energy supplies, such as Germany. We need to understand that Putin’s popularity 
is at an all-time high and he is very much in charge and driven by his view of what Russia should be as a great 
power and how it should act.
It remains to be seen how this confrontation between Russia and NATO is resolved. NATO is increasing its 
combat air patrols along the border between Russia and the Baltic states and NATO warships are being 
deployed to the Baltic and Black Seas. America is sending small army units of about 150 troops each to 
Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is unlikely that Putin is planning a military confrontation with NATO, 
which — short of the use of nuclear weapons — he is unlikely to win. But if he invades the eastern part 
of Ukraine there is a real risk of escalation. As Henry Kissinger has noted, understanding US values and 
psychology are not Putin’s strong suits, nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong 
point of US policymakers.13 There is a dangerous risk here of mutual incomprehension.
Strategic Implications, Including for Asia
I do not accept that all this implies we are returning 
to the dangers of the Cold War. But it does mean 
the view in the West that state-on-state conflict is an 
obsolete idea is no longer tenable. Europe, in particular, 
needs to relearn the fact that the use of force majeure 
by the dominant regional power has returned. There 
is now a risk of a direct Russian clash with NATO 
if Ukraine slides into civil war and Putin decides to 
intervene. Putin’s response to European appeals for 
him to recognise the sanctity of international borders is to sarcastically cite how the European Union encouraged 
Kosovo to separate from Serbia, another Slavic country. He has also noted how, in his view, America ignored 
international borders in its own interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. The fact is that big powers, including 
China these days, tend to act like big powers and this is a real wake-up call for the contemporary strategic era.
“ We cannot rule out the further 
use of Russian military force in 
eastern Ukraine, with all the risks of 
miscalculation that implies. ”
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Any idea of bringing Russia into the community of democratic nations is now dead. And we cannot rule out the 
further use of Russian military force in eastern Ukraine, with all the risks of miscalculation that implies. However, 
those who are urging the United States militarily to confront a heavily nuclear-armed Russia —whose doctrine 
is for the early use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of being faced with superior conventional forces—
need to contemplate the risks involved. As former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said ‘There is no 
real military option’.14 And other American commentators have declared that there are no US vital interests in 
Ukraine (despite the precedent-setting effect of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and potentially eastern Ukraine).15
One possible scenario is that this crisis will be resolved by Ukraine declaring that it will never join NATO and 
conceding substantial regional autonomy to the heavily Russian-speaking parts of eastern Ukraine.16 That 
will involve a serious loss of independence for a 
separate Ukrainian state. In effect, Ukraine would 
become an integral part of the Russian sphere of 
influence and be within Moscow’s orbit of what 
is deemed permissible. Another alternative is 
the spectre of Russia invading Ukraine and re-
incorporating it into Russia. If that happens, the 
bear will have arrived back as a dangerous major 
power risking military confrontation with the West. 
For Australia, there is little we can do other than 
condemn this blatant act of aggression and join 
any sanctions the West imposes. But we need to factor into our calculations that large authoritarian countries 
like Russia and China are flexing their muscles and will not necessarily abide by the norms of international 
behaviour. Resisting coercion should be an important element in the strategic thinking of our new Defence 
White Paper. In particular, we need to consider whether Beijing will be emboldened in its attitude to the US by 
Russia’s successful use of military force and the weak response by Washington to Putin’s military adventurism.
In the last couple of years China has started to throw its weight around with territorial issues in the East China 
Sea and the South China Sea. If Beijing perceives Washington’s defence of its European allies as weak in the 
“ We need to factor into our calculations 
that large authoritarian countries like 
Russia and China are flexing their 
muscles and will not necessarily abide by 
the norms of international behaviour. ”
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face of Russian aggression, might it be encouraged to push harder against Japan and the Philippines in Asia? 
China may well see parallels in EU and NATO weakness against Russian aggression with the inability of security 
organisations in Asia, such as ASEAN, to respond to current Chinese military adventurism. 
There is a further complication about whether the US may now be forced to deploy more of its military forces to 
the European theatre at a time when there is increasing questioning in Asia about Washington’s so-called ’pivot’ 
to the region. Will the distraction of Russia further 
hinder Washington’s rebalancing of military forces to 
the Asia-Pacific region and divert its attention from 
a rising China? Japan will be closely monitoring this 
issue for any implications for its alliance with the US. 
Much will depend upon how much further the crisis 
between Russia and Ukraine goes and how NATO, 
and particularly America, responds. 
Another consideration is whether Russia now will be 
more dependent on a good relationship with Beijing 
and will this see an even greater coincidence of anti-
Western views by Putin and China’s President Xi Jinping? China has signed a huge natural gas agreement with 
Russia worth $400 billion over the next 30 years, which will significantly lessen Russia’s economic dependence 
on Europe.17 The prospect of Russia getting closer to the West in order to balance China has become distinctly 
more distant. 
For Australia, our defence planning now needs to factor in more the risk of conventional threats to international 
security and not be lulled into a false sense of security by believing that the only credible foreseeable threats are 
insurgencies, terrorism and non-traditional security issues. 
The post-Cold War era in Europe has now ended; it remains to be seen what its strategic impact might be on 
Asia. A new era of nationalist resurgence and territorial occupation unconstrained by international laws and 
norms might well be Putin’s legacy.18 And this may be the necessary wake-up call for Washington that brings 
geopolitics back into play in the world order with a vengeance.
“ Will the distraction of Russia further 
hinder Washington’s rebalancing of 
military forces to the Asia-Pacific 
region and divert its attention from a 
rising China? ”
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POLICY RECOMMENDATION
•	 Australia’s defence strategy should now take account of how major powers such as China and 
Russia might use conventional force, or threats of use of conventional force, to challenge territorial 
sovereignty and impose their will more generally. 
•	 Canberra also needs to factor into its strategic assessments the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on 
a) China’s strategic policy and regional ambitions and b) the US military commitment to Asia.
•	 Given the rise of military capabilities and nationalism in our region, the new Defence White Paper 
should give appropriate priority to policies of countering conventional threats and coercion, including 
from major powers. 
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